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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030193-CA

v.
WESLEY OSHLEY, JR.,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of two counts of
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony (R. 313-15).1

This

Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-2a-3(2) (j) (2002) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Where defendant was on trial for a knife attack on members
of his former girlfriend's family, was evidence of his prior
knife attack on his former girlfriend admissible as prior bad
acts evidence under rule 404 (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence?
1

The cover of defendant's Brief of Appellant correctly
reflects that defendant was convicted on two counts of aggravated
burglary, a first degree felony, and one count of evading an
officer, a second degree felony. Defendant, however, seeks
relief only as to the two aggravated burglaries. See Br. of
Aplt. at 21. The evading charge, therefore, is not before the
Court on appeal.

An appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard
when reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence
pursuant to rule 404(b).

State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 142, 28

P.3d 1278.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated
burglary, a first degree felony; one count of aggravated sexual
assault, a first degree felony; one count of attempted aggravated
kidnaping, a second degree felony; and one count of failure to
respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony (R.
7-8).

Defendant was tried by a jury, which found him guilty of

both charges of aggravated burglary and of failure to respond to
-2-

an officer's signal to stop (R. 220-21).

The trial court

sentenced defendant to two consecutive five-to-life terms on the
first degree felonies, and zero-to-five years on the third degree
felony, to run concurrently with the second five-to-life term.
The court ordered that defendant serve his sentence consecutive
to the term he was already serving on another matter.

Finally,

the court imposed restitution of $835 (R. 313-15; 318-19).
Defendant filed a timely appeal from the first-degree felony
convictions (R. 316-17).

This Court has jurisdiction over the

case pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4) (2003) (R. 328) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
Becky G. was eighteen when she began dating the 21-year-old
defendant in May of 2001 (R. 348: 92). Within three months, she
became pregnant (Id. at 95). Becky felt ambivalent about both
the relationship and the pregnancy, matters she discussed with
her family and with defendant.

Her older sister, Robin,

testified that although defendant wanted Becky to keep the baby,
"[Becky]

was

not okay with that" (R. 347 at 191). According to

Robin, Becky did not feel "stable in the relationship or secure"
and was "traumatized about the fact that she was pregnant, and
she didn't feel ready" (Id.).

Robin added, "I didn't want to see

2

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict. .See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, 12, 999 P.2d 565.
-3-

Becky go through what I thought would be a very, very difficult
time for her." (Id.).
Becky testified that she discussed the pregnancy and the
possibility of an abortion with defendant "extensively" before
they broke up in late August (R. 348: 96). She and defendant
talked for the last time about the pregnancy on the balcony of
defendant's apartment (Id. at 109). Becky testified:
I was telling [defendant] that I didn't feel
like I could take care of a baby, that I
wasn't ready for it. I didn't feel like I
could do it and that I felt uncomfortable
with it, and I wasn't sure whether I could
keep the baby or not. And he told me — he
told me that I was just like the rest of my
people, and I wanted to kill everything. And
I told him I thought it was stupid that he
would say that to me.
(Id.).

Defendant then grabbed Becky, telling her she was

"horrible" for not wanting to keep the baby, and forcibly took
her inside to the bedroom (Id.).

There, he began to choke her.

She kicked back at him but could not get away.

He choked her a

second time until she nearly passed out (Id.).

Eventually, he

took her to the kitchen, grabbed a knife, and threatened to slit
her throat if she screamed or tried to get away (Id. at 109-10).
He then took her into the bathroom, asking her, "Are you scared?
Do you know what I'm capable of?" (Id. at 110).
Terrified, Becky "tried to just talk him down," which took
about an hour.

Defendant would not let Becky leave the apartment

that night (Id.).

The next morning, as soon as defendant left

for work, Becky packed up her personal belongings and left (Id.
-4-

at 110). Not wanting any further contact with defendant, she
refused his telephone calls or hung up as soon as she recognized
his voice (Id. at 111) .

Becky did not report the fight to the

police because defendant "told me if I ever told anybody about
it, he would go after my family" (Id. at 112).
A week later, Becky terminated the pregnancy (Id.).

Summing

up her reasons, she cited the violent circumstances of her final
night with defendant, defendant's escalating use of alcohol,3 and
defendant's assertion that he would only act as a father figure
to the child if it turned out to be a boy (Id.).
•k

-k

*

Close to two months later, at about 9 o'clock on a Friday
evening in late October of 2001, one of Becky's younger sisters,
Katie, was working as a bagger at Smith's when defendant,
purchasing alcohol, approached her check stand (Id. at 84, 87).
Defendant asked Katie "what Becky had done with the baby" (Id. at
86).

Katie initially told him "it wasn't my place and my

responsibility to tell him," but eventually revealed that Becky
"had not kept the baby" (Id.).

Defendant left the store "mad"

(Id. at 88-89).
That same evening, Becky's mother, two of Becky's sisters,
and a few of their friends visited a haunted house and then had a

3

Becky testified that, "almost every night," defendant
"usually drank almost a 12-pack of beer to himself [sic], or he
would have a lot of vodka. He would be able to drink probably
about three-fourths of it himself" (R. 348: 118).
-5-

get-together at the apartment where Becky and her family lived
(R. 347: 148, 197).

By midnight, everyone had left except

Becky's mother, Penny; her sisters, Robin and Megan; and a friend
of Megan's who was spending the night (Id.).

By about two

o'clock in the morning, both Penny and Robin had gone to bed (Id.
at 149, 197, 227). Megan and her friend stayed up, playing on
the computer and later slipping out the unlocked front door to
talk outside under a nearby tree for about an hour and a half
(Id. at 227-29).
Robin, "kind of half asleep," was awakened around three
o'clock when someone opened her bedroom door and entered the room
(Id. at 149, 183). Almost immediately, after pulling back the
covers, the person was on top of her, violently grabbing her and
sticking his fingers down her throat (Id. at 149, 154). 4
man's first words were, "Where's Becky?" (Id. at 153).

The
Because

the room was not very dark, Robin could see "well enough" and
recognized the man as defendant (Id. at 153).

She struggled with

him, screaming, grabbing his hair, and biting his finger (Id.).
Defendant put a knife to Robin's throat and threatened to kill
her unless she "shut up" (Id. at 154).
At that juncture, realizing "it wasn't a good idea to be
fighting with [defendant] if he had a knife," Robin decided to

4

Defendant's attack on Robin also gave rise to charges of
aggravated sexual assault and attempted aggravated kidnaping (R.
7-8). The jury, however, acquitted him of these charges (R. 29394) .
-6-

"just wait. . . to see what he wanted or what was the purpose"
(Id. at 157). Defendant ordered Robin to get dressed.

As she

did so, defendant continued to threaten her with the knife, and
ask about Becky's whereabouts and whether she was scared (Id. at
158-59).

Robin repeatedly asked defendant what he wanted and

told defendant that Becky was not at home (Id. at 159).5
Defendant responded, "^Well, that's okay. I have you'" (Id.).
Holding the knife to Robin's throat, defendant led her out
the front door of the second-floor apartment and down a flight of
stairs (Id. at 160). About half-way down, Robin broke away, ran
back up the stairs, down a hallway, and then down another set of
stairs at the other end of the hallway (Id. at 162-63).
Defendant pursued her across the parking lot but then stopped
(Id. at 167). Robin ran into another apartment building, found
an unlocked door, burst in, and called the police (Id. at 16768) .
Defendant, meanwhile, returned to Becky's family's
apartment.

Becky's mother, Penny, testified that she was

awakened by defendant "standing over my bed with a very large
butcher knife in his hand.

He was threatening me with it, and he

was telling me to get up"6 (Id. at 198) . While Penny quickly
5

Becky had gone to a friend's house that night and did not
return home until the next morning around 7:30 a.m. (R. 347: 195,
210; R. 348: 95).
6

Penny testified that she heard nothing of the earlier
events involving defendant and Robin. She attributed this to
sleeping with a "sound spa," which emitted white noise. In
-7-

dressed, defendant, "obviously upset," repeatedly demanded to
know where Becky was.

He commented "something along the lines

that our family had ^F'-ed him over and that he tried to change
his life for Becky" (Id. at 202). He then told Penny she was
coming with him (Id. at 200-02).

Defendant backed Penny out of

her bedroom and into the bedroom normally shared by Becky and
Megan (Id. at 200).

Penny tried to reason with defendant; he

kept repeating himself, unresponsive to her efforts.

Eventually,

defendant struck Penny in the face with his fist, using enough
force to knock her down (Id. at 203).

She testified, "I got up

and continued to try and reason with him, and he hit me again.
He hit me two more times in the same place"7 (Id.).

Finally,

defendant fled the apartment (Id. at 204).
Penny immediately ran to check on her children.
gone, as were Megan and her friend.

Robin was

In a panic, Penny called the

police (Id^ at 205; R. 348: 8 ) . 8
Penny described defendant to the responding officer (R. 348:
9).

Within a few minutes after radio transmittal of the

description, another officer spotted defendant and activated his

addition, she had a fan running in her bedroom, and her bedroom
door was closed (R. 347: 199)
7

Defendant's blows fractured Penny's nose and cheek bone
on the left side (R. 347: 203).
8

Megan and her friend, talking under the tree, returned to
the apartment shortly after defendant left for the second time
but before the police arrived. They found the door locked, Robin
gone, and Penny distraught and bleeding (R. 347: 230-31).
-8-

light bar and "wigwags" to stop him (Id. at 51-52).

Defendant

responded by leading the police on a high speed chase through
city streets and then onto the freeway, at times reaching 105
miles an hour (Id. at 52-56).

The police executed several

maneuvers to gain control of the situation, and defendant lost
control of his vehicle more than once (Id. at 56-58) . The chase
ended only after defendant hit a ditch that launched his vehicle
into the air for almost 50 feet, disabling it on impact (Id. at
68-70).
When officers approached the vehicle, they found defendant
locked inside, clutching a knife, spouting profanities, and
actively resisting removal by rigidly gripping the steering wheel
or headrest (Id. at 13, 71, 81-82).

Although defendant complied

with the order to drop the knife,9 police had to use force to
remove him from the vehicle (Id. at 82). And, once outside the
vehicle, additional force was necessary to handcuff him (Id.).
Defendant was transported to a hospital, where his blood
alcohol level was determined to be .11 (Id. at 60).

9

Penny later identified the weapon as a Cutco knife, one
of a set, kept in her kitchen, that her son had given her while
he was a Cutco salesman (R. 347: 155, 206).
-9-

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
WHERE DEFENDANT WAS ON TRIAL FOR A
KNIFE ATTACK ON HIS EX-GIRLFRIEND'S
FAMILY, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING,
PURSUANT TO RULE 404(B), EVIDENCE
THAT HE HAD ALSO PREVIOUSLY
ATTACKED HIS EX-GIRLFRIEND WITH A
KNIFE
Defendant argues that Becky's testimony about her violent
evening with defendant just prior to breaking up with him
violated rule 404 (b) because the testimony was offered "solely to
prove bad character and that he had a propensity to commit crime
and that he acted in conformity with that character" (Br. of
Aplt. at 14).

Defendant further asserts that, even assuming the

evidence was offered for a proper non-character purpose, it was
not relevant and should have been excluded pursuant to rule 402
(Id. at 16-17).

Finally, he contends that the trial court

misapplied rule 403 by determining that the probative value of
the testimony was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
impact.

In defendant's view, the evidence was so highly

inflammatory that, had it not been admitted, he would likely have
received a more favorable verdict (Id. at 14, 20-21).
Defendant's claim is governed by rule 404(b), which includes
analysis under rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
That is, "in deciding whether evidence of other crimes is
admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court must determine (1)
whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter
-10-

purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the
requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the
requirements of rule 403."
993 P.2d 837.

State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 120,

Here, the trial court applied rule 404(b),

determining that Becky's testimony addressing her last encounter
with defendant was relevant and admissible:
[T]he testimony relates to multiple questions
relating to the trial proceeding, which
include, amongst other things, questions of
motive, the relationship of [Becky] to
[defendant], reasons for his presence at the
apartment, and other matters which I think
are relevant and probative.
R. 348: 104.

The court also referenced a balancing test,

concluding:
In weighing the probative value of the
testimony as opposed to the prejudicial
effect, I find that it is more probative than
prejudicial, knowing also the time and scope
I've heard to this juncture. Therefore, I'll
allow the examination.
Id.10

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by so ruling.
A.

Rule 404 (b)

Rule 404(b), governing evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts to prove the character of a person, is an "inclusionary"
rule.

State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1993); State
10

In fact, rule 403 calls for a determination of whether
the probative value of the evidence "is substantially
outweighed
by the danger of unfair
prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis
added). The court's application of a simple balancing test, and
its statement that the testimony was more probative than
prejudicial necessarily encompasses within it a determination
that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially
outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
-11-

v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991).

That is, "[r]ule

404(b) does not exclude evidence unless it fits an exception;
rather, it allows admission of relevant evidence ^other than to
show merely the general disposition of the defendant.'" State v.
Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989)(quoting State v.
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983)).

This approach admits

"all evidence of other crimes relevant to an issue at trial
except that evidence that proves only

criminal disposition."

State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d at 568 (citing 2 J.Weinstein & M.
Berger, Weinstein' s Evidence, § 404[08] (1990) ) (emphasis added).
In this case, Becky's testimony served the non-character
purpose of completing the story for the jury.

By explaining the

circumstances surrounding her breakup with defendant, Becky
helped the jury understand why the relationship ended, why she
opted for an abortion, and why defendant was so angry about that
decision.

That is, while the jury already knew that Becky was

ambivalent about the pregnancy, her choice to abort made far more
sense in the context of defendant's deteriorating pattern of
behavior, including his escalating use of alcohol, his statements
about only being a father to a male child and, ultimately, his
violent behavior towards her (R. 348: 112, 1 1 8 ) . n
11

Becky also testified that she was Caucasian and
defendant was Native American and that he "would sometimes say
things like, your people are different, and, your people do
things that my people would never do" (R. 348: 117). In this
context, Becky testified that on the night of the fight,
defendant angrily told her she "was just like the rest of [her]
people, and [she] wanted to kill everything" (Id. at 109). The
-12-

Evidence that completes a story by filling in facts
necessary for a jury to understand the context of a crime is
admissible as non-character evidence under rule 404 (b) .

See

State v. Dominquez, 2003 UT App 158, 521, 72 P.3d 127 (admitting
testimony that provides necessary context for other admissible
evidence relevant to crime at issue); State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d
1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that although rule 404
contains no express exception for "background information"
showing how the charges came forward, "the prosecutor is entitled
to paint a factual picture of the context in which the events in
question transpired");

State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah

1986)(holding that evidence showing "the general circumstances
surrounding" the crime should not be excluded as "prior crimes"
evidence under rule 404(b)).

Because Becky's testimony about the

circumstances of her breakup with defendant provided relevant
background for the context of defendant's subsequent criminal
conduct, it was properly admitted under rule 404(b).
Becky's testimony also went directly to defendant's defense.
Although defendant conceded that he went to the apartment at
about three o'clock in the morning, that he grabbed Robin by the
shoulder and shook her, and that he "smacked" Penny in
frustration, he consistently denied that he ever threatened

cultural chasm expressed through defendant's words explains
defendant's extreme reaction upon learning that Becky had
terminated the pregnancy. It explains the context in which he
went to her apartment and tried desperately and irrationally to
locate her.
-13-

either Robin or Penny with a knife (R. 348: 134, 138, 140, 143).
Becky's testimony of a similar knife threat six weeks earlier
thus goes directly to an issue defendant contests - whether he
attacked Robin and Penny with a dangerous weapon.

See State v.

Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, 129, 6 P.3d 1120 (similarity in type
of crime combined with temporal proximity "Virtually guarantees
admittance of prior bad acts evidence'")(citation omitted).
B.

Rule 402

Becky's testimony also plainly complied with rule 402, which
governs relevance.

If the evidence "tends to prove some fact

material to the crime charged," it will be admitted, even though
it may also tend to prove that defendant committed other crimes
or bad acts.

State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah

1982); accord State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, 531, 61 P.3d 291
("[I]f prior bad acts evidence ^tends to prove some fact that is
material to the crime charged,' it is relevant and admissible
under rule 402")(citation omitted).
Here, Becky's testimony explained the nature of the
relationship between Becky and defendant, which prompted her to
seek an abortion and motivated defendant's later criminal acts.
It also explained that Becky and defendant were operating under
different cultural assumptions that gave rise to different
attitudes about terminating a pregnancy.

Her testimony that she

hadn't told anyone about the fight because defendant had
threatened to "go after" her family also helped explain

-14-

defendant's motive in violently attacking both Robin and Penny
when he was unable to locate Becky at the apartment.

Defendant

himself had testified that Becky's mother and sister had become
involved in Becky's decisions about the relationship and the
pregnancy, a reality defendant resented (R. 348: 130-31).

His

earlier remarks to Becky corroborated his belief that Becky's
family influenced her decision-making and could be held
accountable for Becky's actions.
C.

Rule 403

Becky's testimony also complied with rule 403, which gives a
trial court the discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is "substantially
unfair

prejudice,

outweighed

by the danger of

confusion of the issues, or misleading the

jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence,"
(emphasis added).

Utah R. Evid. 403

The fact that evidence may be prejudicial does

not alone render it incompetent.

Rather, "[i]f evidence is

prejudicial but is at least equally probative of a critical fact,
it is properly admissible."

State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d at 571.

Indeed, all relevant evidence is presumed admissible pursuant to
rule 403 unless it has "an unusual propensity to unfairly
prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury."

State v. Dunn, 850

P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993).
In balancing the probative value of rule 404(b) evidence
against the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant, factors such
-15-

as "^the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the
other crime [or misconduct], the similarities between the crimes,
the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the
degree to which the evidence will rouse the jury to overmastering
hostility'" are relevant.

State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 150, 28

P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah
1988) ) . 1 2

Of these factors, the Utah Supreme Court has stated,

">[P]roximity in time combined with similarity in type of crime
virtually guarantees admittance of prior bad acts evidence.'"
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at 129 (quoting United
States v. Drew, 894 F.2d 965, 970 (8th Cir. 1990)).
In this case, the combination of proximity and similarity
renders Becky's testimony highly probative and, consequently,
admissible.

First, there were strong similarities between

defendant's attack on Becky and his later attacks on Robin and
Penny.

In all three instances, defendant took a knife from the

kitchen and brandished it against the women in a life-threatening
manner (R. 347: 154; R. 348: 109-10).

He told both Becky and

Robin to shut up or he would kill them or slit their throats (R.

12

If the evidence weighs in favor of probativeness,
defendant is entitled to a cautionary jury instruction, limiting
the applicability of the evidence. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d
at 296. Defendant, however, must request such an instruction.
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985).
Here,
defendant failed to do so. See R. 88-123. His inaction
constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal. State v. Rocco, 795
P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1990).
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347: 153; R. 348: 110). He also tried to choke Becky and Robin,
later pointedly asking each of them, "Are you scared?" or "Do you
know what I can do?" (R. 347: 158, 180; R. 348: 109, 110). He
was physically and verbally aggressive with all three women,
forcing them from room to room at his will (R. 347: 149-50, 154,
160; R. 348: 109).
Second, only six weeks passed between Becky's violent last
night with defendant and the night of the crimes at issue here.
This is not a significant interval.

See, e.g., State v. Holbert,

2002 UT App 426 at 1141 (three-month interval between choking
incident and crime at issue considered "minimal"); State v.
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at 129 (time between all incidents
was "a brief ten weeks"); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at 132
(seven-month interval deemed "relatively short").
Furthermore, in addition to the similarities between the
crimes and their temporal proximity, Becky's testimony was not
the sort of evidence that would "rouse the jury to overmastering
hostility."

State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d at 571 (citation omitted).

The evidence of the earlier attack on Becky was "no worse than
the evidence" of the later attacks on her sister or mother.
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60 at 152.

Indeed, after hearing from

Robin and Penny, the jury simply heard more of the same type of
conduct from Becky.

There were few details in Becky's recitation

that were substantively different from the later attack on Robin,
to which Robin had already testified.
-17-

Because Becky's testimony was relevant for the non-character
purpose of completing the story and because defendant has failed
to articulate how the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed the probative value of that testimony, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in permitting Becky to testify about
her violent last night with defendant.
And, in any event, even if the trial court erred in
admitting Becky's testimony, the error was harmless.

Other

jurisdictions that have considered the question of an erroneous
admission of Rule 404 (b) evidence have ruled that if the
admission of the evidence was harmless, there is no necessity for
reversal.

See. State v. Halstien, 857 P.2d 270, 281 (Wash.

1993)(ruling that the trial court's failure to "weigh any
prejudicial effect did not substantially affect the outcome and
is harmless error"); State v. Atwood, 832 P.2d 593, 656 (Ariz.
1992)(holding that because no "reasonable probability exists that
the verdict would have been different" the error in admitting the
404(b) testimony was harmless); McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740,
753 (Wyo. 1993) ("the admission of the tire slashing evidence was
an abuse of discretion by the district court because it violated
W.R.E. 404(b).

However, we cannot conclude that the jury would

likely have reached a different verdict had this evidence been
excluded").
Similarly, in this case, even assuming arguendo that the
testimony should not have been admitted, any error in its
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admission would have been harmless.

See State v. O'Neil, 848

P.2d at 699 ("Improperly admitted evidence requires reversal of a
conviction only where we conclude there is a ^reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings'")(citation omitted).

Here, even absent Becky's

testimony, the verdict against defendant would likely have
remained the same.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of

aggravated burglary, a first degree felony (R. 313-15).

In this

case, an aggravated burglary conviction would require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of entering or remaining unlawfully in
a dwelling with intent to commit a felony or assault.

See Utah

Code Ann. § 76-6-202. Absent the challenged testimony, the jury
still had before it testimony from both Penny and Robin that
defendant entered and remained in their apartment without
permission and that he intentionally assaulted both of them.
See R. 347: 151, 154, 202-04.
Further, aggravated burglary requires that the actor "causes
bodily injury" or "uses or threatens the immediate use of a
dangerous weapon."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(1)(a),(b). Here,

wholly apart from the challenged testimony, both Robin and Penny
testified that defendant threatened them with a large and
distinctive Cutco knife, part of a set that Penny's son had given
her (R. 347: 155, 170, 206). When defendant was finally
apprehended after the high-speed car chase, officers found him
clutching that very knife (R. 348: 20, 81). Denying that he took
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it from the apartment, defendant could only explain its presence
by stating, "me and my brother were going to have a cookout" (Id.
at 143).

In addition, Penny unequivocally testified that

defendant caused her bodily injury by punching her so hard in the
face that he fractured her nose and cheek bone (Id. at 203).
Given the strength of this evidence, even if the trial court
were found to have abused its discretion in admitting Becky's
testimony about her violent last night with defendant, there was
no substantial likelihood that, absent the testimony, the outcome
would have been different.
therefore, was harmless.

Any error as to its admission,
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d at 431;

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions on two counts of aggravated burglary, a first degree
felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this <?2_ day of March, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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